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Manuscript.  17 
Introductory paragraph: 18 
Benchmarks to guide countries in ratcheting-up ambition, climate finance, and support in an 19 
equitable manner are critical but not yet determined in the context of the Paris Agreement1. We 20 
identify global cost-optimal mitigation scenarios consistent with the Paris Agreement goals and 21 
allocate their emissions dynamically to countries according to five equity approaches. At the 22 
national level, China’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) is weaker than any of the five 23 
equity approaches suggests, India’s NDC is aligned with two, and the EU’s and the USA’s with 24 
three. Most developing countries’ conditional (Intended) NDCs (INDCs) are more ambitious 25 
than the average of the five equity approaches under the 2°C goal. If the G8 and China adopt the 26 
average of the five approaches, the gap between conditional INDCs and 2°C consistent pathways 27 
could be closed. Equitable, cost-optimal, achievement of the 1.5°C target allocates the G8 and 28 
China combined 21% emissions lower in 2030 (relative to 2010 levels) than for 2°C, and 39% 29 
lower for remaining countries. Equitably limiting warming to 1.5°C rather than 2°C requires that 30 
individual countries achieve mitigations milestones, such as peaking or reaching net-zero 31 
emissions, around a decade earlier. 32 
  33 
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Main text: 34 
To achieve its global mitigation objectives (Fig. 1a), the Paris Agreement binds countries to 35 
periodically take stock of collective progress “in light of equity and the best available science”1, 36 
starting in 2018. The Agreement did not indicate national mitigation targets aligned with the 37 
long-term goals and “notes with concern that the estimated aggregate greenhouse gas emissions 38 
levels in 2025 and 2030 resulting from the intended nationally determined contributions do not 39 
fall within cost-optimal 2˚C scenarios”1. Indeed, the current “bottom-up” situation, whereby 40 
countries determine their own mitigation targets, results in projected annual global emissions of 41 
52.5 GtCO2eq (ref. 2) in 2030 (average of 49.4 GtCO2eq and 55.6 GtCO2eq, respectively the 42 
‘high-ambition’ and ‘low-ambition’ estimates of ref. 3, SAR GWP-100, Methods), inconsistent 43 
with Integrated Assessment Models’ (IAMs) cost-optimal trajectories to 2°C or 1.5°C (ref. 4, 44 
Fig. 1a).  45 
In 1992, under the United Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), all countries 46 
agreed to pursue mitigation efforts according to their “Common but Differentiated 47 
Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities”5 (CBDR-RC), with efforts differentiated between 48 
developed (Annex I) and developing countries. The Paris Agreement moved to a sliding scale of 49 
self-differentiation on emissions mitigation. While co-benefits and self-interest can drive rapid 50 
mitigation actions6, current contributions are insufficient to match the ambition of the Paris 51 
Agreement. Therefore, equity is still central for the ratcheting process and when discussing the 52 
adequate magnitude of climate finance and support7. All ratifying Parties must communicate 53 
successive NDCs that represent a progression and reflect the “highest possible ambition” in 54 
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relation to their CBDR-RC. The Paris Agreement still invites developed countries, without 55 
naming them8, to take the lead in reducing economy-wide emissions and mobilizing climate 56 
finance.   57 
Historically, few countries have indicated which guiding principle9–11 or formula12 could be used 58 
to ensure equitable mitigation contributions. Instead, most countries merely declared their 59 
INDCs to be “fair and ambitious”, either explicitly (e.g. India and the USA13) or implicitly by 60 
stating their contribution. Here we inform the question of fairness by quantifying national 61 
emissions allocations using five ‘equity approaches’. Unlike most earlier studies, we use a 62 
methodology that aligns aggregate emissions allocations with IAM global emissions scenarios 63 
that are consistent with the Paris Agreement’s long-term goals. 64 
Several studies have modelled equity principles to allocate 2°C-consistent emissions scenarios 65 
across countries12,14–24. The IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (IPCC-AR5) grouped the 66 
distributive justice concepts of over 40 studies in five equity categories18,25 (Table 1). Most of 67 
these studies allocate emissions of different global scenarios that are not always cost-optimal; 68 
comparing allocations at a specific point in time is therefore difficult. More recent studies 69 
developed frameworks that allocate emissions from a unique global scenario across countries 70 
following multiple equity approaches, and derived national GHG (ref. 21,24) or CO2 only
20,23 71 
scenarios consistent with the 2°C limit. However, national equitable emissions allocations 72 
consistent with the 1.5°C goal have not yet been assessed in the literature. 73 
5 
 
We use the five IPCC-AR5 equity categories25 to define five equity approaches24 (Table 1). 74 
These allocation approaches are applied to cost-optimal scenarios selected from the database 75 
accompanying the IPCC-AR5 and ref. 26 that have net-zero emissions by 2100 and at least a 76 
likely (>66%) chance to limit warming to 2°C (Methods). We explore five ‘sets’ of GHG 77 
emissions scenarios based on this selection (Table 1): (i) 32 scenarios peaking by 2020 (‘2°C-78 
pre2020peak’), (ii) 39 peaking by 2020 with a more likely than not (>50%) chance to return to 79 
1.5°C in 2100 (‘1.5°C-pre2020peak’), (iii) 6 scenarios peaking in 2030 (‘2°C-2030peak’), (iv) a 80 
custom ‘2°C-statedINDCs’ scenario with interpolated emissions between 2030 pledged INDC 81 
levels3 and, from 2050 onwards, the average of the ‘2°C-2030peak’scenarios, and (v) a ‘2°C-82 
fairINDCs’ scenario equal to global scenario (iv) but with allocations starting in 2010 (Fig. 1a). 83 
The ‘2°C-2030peak’ scenarios are only loosely consistent with the Paris Agreement (Methods). 84 
Emissions allocations of all sets start in 2010, except for (iv), which starts in 2030 at national 85 
INDCs levels.  86 
[TABLE 1] 87 
The ‘2°C-pre2020peak’ scenario set has a 2030 average of 39.7 GtCO2eq, similar to the Paris 88 
decision indicative target of 40 GtCO2eq, and becomes net-zero as early as 2080 (Fig. 1a). The 89 
‘1.5°C-pre2020peak’ set averages at 32.6 GtCO2eq in 2030 and becomes negative between 2059 90 
and 2087. Average annual global emissions reduction rates over the 2030-2050 period, as a 91 
fraction of 2010 levels, are 1.6%/y for early-action ‘2°C-pre2020peak’ scenarios (reaching 92 
2.1%/y in 2025), 2.2%/y for 1.5°C scenarios (reaching 2.3%/y in 2039), and 3.2%/y for delayed-93 
action ‘2°C-2030peak’ scenarios (reaching 3.5%/y from 2040 to 2050). 94 
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The selected cost-optimal scenarios rely on the IAM’s assumptions of harmonized international 95 
policies and emissions trading systems that are currently not in place. However, the Paris 96 
Agreement has recognized the voluntary “use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes 97 
towards nationally determined contributions”1. The emissions allocations determined here could 98 
be met through a combination of domestic mitigation, internationally traded emissions 99 
mitigation1 and international financial contributions toward global mitigation24. Under any of our 100 
modelled equity approaches, the national emissions scenarios are not cost-optimal if applied 101 
domestically. However, they are consistent with a global cost-optimal scenario if countries 102 
choose the right mix of domestic mitigation and transfer of support for additional mitigation 103 
elsewhere. National mitigation costs are allocated indirectly through the allocation of emissions 104 
allowances. A fair distribution of mitigation costs could be used to derive equitable emissions 105 
allocation when comprehensive national-level mitigation cost estimates are available.  106 
We allocate to all countries GHG emissions scenarios that add up, under each of the five equity 107 
approaches (Supplementary Tables), to global cost-optimal IAM scenarios – excluding emissions 108 
from Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF), and international shipping and 109 
aviation (Methods). 110 
At the regional level (Fig. 1c-l), Middle East and Africa’s aggregated (I)NDCs are consistent 111 
with all approaches except the CER under all scenario-sets. Asia’s aggregated (I)NDCs are not 112 
consistent with any allocation under early-action scenarios, while the OECD’s are consistent 113 
with the GDR and CER under the ‘2°C-pre2020peak’ and with none under ‘1.5°C-pre2020peak’. 114 
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Only the aggregated (I)NDCs of the Middle East and Africa are consistent with some 1.5°C 115 
allocations (with great disparities at the sub-regional level, Supplementary Discussion).  116 
At the national level (Fig. 1c-g), all equity approaches require China’s emissions to peak earlier 117 
and lower than its current NDC. The USA’s and the EU’s NDCs are in line with the CER 118 
allocation and the higher end of the ‘2°C-pre2020peak’ range under the GDR or EPC allocations. 119 
India’s NDC is consistent with the CPC and EPC allocations of ‘2°C-pre2020peak’ scenarios, 120 
and the CPC allocation averaged over the ‘1.5°C-pre2020peak’ scenarios lies within the NDC 121 
assessment’s uncertainty range (Fig. 1b, other countries in Supplementary Tables and provided at 122 
at: www.paris-equity-check.org). 123 
[FIGURE 1] 124 
Combining multiple visions of equity – using weighting factors20 or a leadership based 125 
approach22 – is not necessarily equitable by design but can represent a political compromise20, 126 
and is useful to compare national allocations under different global goals or scenarios sets. The 127 
fairness of the CER, or ‘grandfathering’, approach is criticized in the literature23,27 and not 128 
supported as such by any Party. However, we include CER in the average because it represents 129 
one of the five IPCC equity categories, stressing national circumstances regarding current 130 
emissions levels, and is implicitly followed by many of the developed countries23,24. The average 131 
allocation of the EU and the USA becomes negative close to mid-century under both the ‘1.5°C-132 
pre2020peak’ and ‘2°C-pre2020peak’ sets. China’s average allocation becomes negative 20 133 
years later, and India’s only at the end of the century.  134 
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[TABLE 2] 135 
Recent studies using alternative implementation24 or modelling21,22 of similar equity approaches  136 
towards 2°C find significant differences in some national emissions allocations, but generally 137 
reach similar conclusions (Supplementary Discussion). Overall, literature focusing on CO2 138 
emissions de-facto ignores other GHG20,23, and often allocates carbon budgets20 impossible to 139 
compare with single-year (I)NDCs. 140 
Reflecting the global scenarios, equitable national allocations towards 1.5°C require earlier 141 
mitigation than for 2°C (Fig. 2, results per-approach in the Supplementary Discussion). To 142 
achieve the 1.5°C goal ‘major economies’ (G8 and China as a group) need to lower their 2030 143 
emissions targets by an additional 21 percent-points relative to 2010 emissions, compared to the 144 
‘2°C-pre2020peak’ case, and other countries (‘other economies’) altogether by 39 additional 145 
percentage-points (Fig. 2a). However, increasing current (I)NDCs by these additional 146 
percentages would not result in fair contributions towards the 1.5°C goal. Indeed, the aggregated 147 
(I)NDCs of the ‘major economies’ should already be 39 percentage-points more stringent than 148 
they currently are to be in line with their averaged allocation under the ‘2°C-pre2020peak’ case 149 
(Fig. 2b). In contrast, the aggregated (I)NDCs of the ‘other economies’ are only 8 percentage-150 
points above ‘2°C-pre2020peak’ average allocations. Consequently, pledges in line with the 151 
1.5°C goal should be respectively 60 and 46 percentage-points more stringent than current 152 
(I)NDCs for ‘major economies’ and ‘other economies’ respectively (Fig. 2c). 153 
9 
 
In order to compare the relative fairness of (I)NDCs under the current global ambition (52.5 154 
GtCO2eq for 2030), we compare (I)NDCs (‘2°C-statedINDCs’ set) with the ‘2°C-fairINDCs’ 155 
allocations (Fig. 2d). We find that the (I)NDCs of ‘other economies’, of the USA, and of the EU 156 
are more ambitious or aligned with their average allocation under current international 2030-157 
ambition, while the (I)NDCs of Canada, of Japan, and especially of Russia and of China are 158 
substantially less ambitious. 159 
Emissions budgets and timing for peaking or net-zero emissions may constitute more easily 160 
actionable targets than temperature goals28. Figures 2e-g compare the average timing when 161 
emissions allocations peak or reach net-zero under the five equity approaches for ‘1.5°C-162 
pre2020peak’ and ‘2°C-pre2020peak’. Net-zero emissions are allocated five years earlier 163 
towards 1.5°C for developing countries, and ten years earlier for developed countries (i.e. around 164 
2055-2060). Developing countries’ allocations peak about ten years earlier and up to 40% lower 165 
towards 1.5°C than 2°C, which implies lower domestic emissions or lower revenues from 166 
emissions-trading. Overall, aiming at 1.5°C rather than towards 2°C requires earlier but not 167 
faster or deeper mitigation at the national level (Supplementary Discussion). 168 
[FIGURE 2] 169 
The lower emissions-end of our (I)NDC quantification (‘high-ambition’ target) is set by the 170 
conditional targets and sometimes by the quantification uncertainty. Hence, in most countries, 171 
these ‘high-ambition’ targets have implicitly been identified as feasible. The implementation of 172 
these ‘high-ambition’ (I)NDCs3 would lead to 2030 emissions of 48.9 GtCO2eq and leave an 8.8 173 
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GtCO2eq gap with the average of ‘2°C-pre2020peak’ scenarios and a 20.4 GtCO2eq gap with the 174 
‘1.5°C-pre2020peak’ average (excluding LULUCF and bunkers emissions, Methods). The 175 
aggregated ‘high-ambition’ (I)NDCs of ‘other economies’ are collectively slightly more 176 
ambitious than the average of their allocations (Fig. 3 and Supplementary Discussion), although 177 
some individual (I)NDCs are less ambitious (e.g. Iran, Saudi-Arabia and Turkey). Therefore, the 178 
‘other economies’ altogether could meet their average ‘fair’ allocation by increasing their current 179 
unconditional contribution to the aggregate level of their conditional (I)NDCs. The average ‘fair’ 180 
allocations of ‘major economies’ is 9.6 GtCO2eq below their current aggregated ‘high-ambition’ 181 
(I)NDCs. Put simply, the average ‘fair’ allocation of ‘major economies’ alone closes the global 182 
2030 mitigation gap to 2°C, provided that other countries achieve their ‘high-ambition’ (I)NDC 183 
targets. Closing the 2030 gap to average ‘1.5°C-pre2020peak’ scenarios requires most countries 184 
to increase their ambition beyond their current conditional (I)NDCs.  185 
[FIGURE 3] 186 
Current aggregate (I)NDCs fall substantially short of meeting either the 2°C or 1.5°C goals2,4. 187 
The ratchet mechanisms established by the Paris Agreement1 need to achieve an additional 13 188 
GtCO2eq reduction in 2030 to align with 2°C cost-optimal scenarios, and 20 GtCO2eq for 1.5°C 189 
(Fig. 1a). We derived ‘Equitably Determined Contributions’ consistent with the five IPCC equity 190 
approaches towards 2°C or 1.5°C goals (Supplementary Tables). Averaging across the five 191 
concepts of equity assigns the effort, beyond current conditional (I)NDCs, required for the 2°C 192 
goal to the G8 and China. Equitably meeting the 1.5°C goal, and avoiding the additional climate 193 
impacts of a 2°C warmer world29, means that almost all national contributions should be 194 
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enhanced substantially, with key milestones, such as peaking or reaching net-zero emissions, 195 
brought forward by a decade or more.  196 
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Additional information 197 
Supplementary information is available in the online version of the paper. Correspondence 198 
should be addressed to Y.R.d.P.. The equitable emissions allocations of all countries are included 199 
in the Supplementary Tables in the online version of the paper and can be visualized at: 200 
www.paris-equity-check.org. 201 
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Figure legends 215 
Figure 1 | Global, national and regional emissions consistent with the Paris Agreement and 216 
five equity principles compared to current pledges. a, IAM scenarios consistent with the Paris 217 
Agreement under ‘1.5°C-pre2020peak’ (red), ‘2°C-pre2020peak’ (blue) and ‘2°C-2030peak’ 218 
cases (purple), and their averages (thicker lines). Scenarios consistent with the 2030 Paris 219 
decision target (green circles) are more opaque. b, Comparison with IPCC-AR5 database 220 
scenarios (grey lines). c-g, National emissions allocations excluding LULUCF compared to 221 
(I)NDCs (black circles). Coloured patches and lines show allocation ranges of global ‘2°C-222 
pre2020peak’ scenarios, and averages over the range of global ‘1.5°C-pre2020peak’ scenarios, 223 
respectively. h-l, Regionally aggregated 2030 allocations and (I)NDCs. 224 
Figure 2 | Comparisons of national emissions change under different global goals. a-d, 225 
Relative changes between ‘1.5°C-pre2020peak’, ‘2°C-pre2020peak’, ‘2°C-statedINDC’ and 226 
‘2°C-fairINDC’ cases over the 2010-2030 period (excluding LULUCF). e-f, Comparison of 227 
timing of first net-zero emissions and peaking national emissions averaged over the five equity 228 
approaches for the ‘1.5°C-pre2020peak’ and ‘2°C-pre2020peak’ cases. g, Average of peaking 229 
emissions levels versus average peaking emissions years for ‘1.5°C-pre2020peak’ and ‘2°C-230 
pre2020peak’ cases. Disk sizes are proportional to 2010 emissions levels. Colours indicate world 231 
regions. G8+China (larger disk) and the rest of the world (smaller disk) are shown in grey. 232 
Figure 3 | Gaps between equitable mitigation allocations and conditional (I)NDCs in 2030. 233 
Countries following individual approaches (tip of coloured patches), or their average (black 234 
14 
 
lines) under the 2°C (panel a) or 1.5°C goals (panel b), reduce or increase the projected 2030 235 
global emissions levels (excluding LULUCF and bunker emissions) compared to aggregated 236 
conditional (I)NDCs. Countries are sorted left to right in decreasing order of 2010 emissions 237 
(proportional to bar width). The global gaps (grey arrow) between current aggregated conditional 238 
(I)NDCs and the average scenarios consistent with the Paris 2°C or 1.5°C goals (grey bar) are 239 
shown in each panel.  240 
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Tables  242 
Table 1 | Allocation approaches and global scenario set descriptions. The allocation 243 
framework modelling and parameterization follow those of ref. 24. More details on the scenario 244 
selection in the Supplementary Methods. 245 
Allocation name Allocation type IPCC category Allocation characteristics 
CAP Capability Capability High mitigation for countries with high GDP per capita. 
EPC Equal per capita Equality Convergence towards equal annual emissions per person. 
GDR Greenhouse 
Development 
Rights 
Responsibility-
capability-need 
High mitigation for countries with high GDP per capita and high 
historical per capita emissions. 
CPC Equal cumulative 
per capita 
Equal cumulative 
per capita 
Populations with high historical emissions have low allocations. 
CER Constant emissions 
ratio 
Staged 
approaches 
Maintains current emissions ratios. 
    
Scenario set Scenario type IPCC category Scenarios characteristics 
1.5°C-pre2020peak 1.5°C scenarios 39 P1P2 scenarios More likely than not (>50%) chance to return to 1.5°C in 2100. 
Global emissions peaking by 2020. National emissions allocated 
from 2010 onwards. 
2°C-pre2020peak 2°C early action 
scenarios 
32 P1P2 scenarios Likely (>66%) chance to stay below 2°C by 2100. Global 
emissions peaking by 2020. National emissions allocated from 
2010 onwards. 
2°C-2030peak 2°C delayed action 
scenario 
6 P3 scenarios Likely (>66%) chance to stay below 2°C by 2100. Global 
emissions peaking in 2030. National emissions allocated from 
2010 onwards. 
2°C-statedINDC 2°C delayed action 
scenario 
1 P3 custom 
scenario 
De-facto likely (>66%) chance to stay below 2°C by 2100. 
Global emissions peaking in 2030. National emissions allocated 
from 2030 (I)NDC levels onwards. 
2°C-fairINDC 2°C delayed action 
scenario 
1 P3 custom 
scenario 
De-facto likely (>66%) chance to stay below 2°C by 2100. 
Global emissions peaking in 2030. National emissions allocated 
from 2010 onwards. 
 246 
Table 2 | Mitigation targets, timing of peaking and net-zero emissions, and emissions 247 
budgets of selected countries for the ‘1.5°C-pre2020peak’ and ‘2°C-pre2020peak’ cases, 248 
averaged over the five equity allocations. Target ranges indicate the extrema across the five 249 
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approaches’ averages. Emissions from LULUCF and bunkers are excluded. Data for all countries 250 
available in the Supplementary Tables. Emissions budgets are accounted from 2010. 251 
Country Goal 
2030 change to 
2010 levels (in %)  
2050 change to 2010 
levels (in %)  
Peaking 
year 
Net-zero 
year 
Budget to 2050 
in GtCO2eq 
Budget to 2100 
in GtCO2eq 
World (no 
bunkers) 
2°C -5  -47  2020 2082 1523 1749 
1.5°
C -33  -78  
Immediat
e 2075 1134 1156 
China 2°C -27 [-59 to 6] -70 [-95 to -44] 
Immediat
e 2075 329 345 
1.5°
C -48 [-71 to -19] -88 [-102 to -76] 
Immediat
e 2065 254 237 
USA 2°C -44 [-66 to -5] -89 [-119 to -47] 
Immediat
e 2067 154 104 
1.5°
C -64 [-80 to -33] -109 [-144 to -78] 
Immediat
e 2057 109 57 
EU 2°C -38 [-62 to -5] -86 
[-122 to -47] Immediat
e 2068 114 94 
1.5°
C -62 [-84 to -33] -106 [-149 to -78] 
Immediat
e 2057 80 54 
India 
2°C 72 [-5 to 155] 40 [-47 to 152] 2033 2087 162 236 
1.5°
C 30 [-33 to 102] -24 [-78 to 63] 2022 2081 122 161 
  252 
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Methods: 313 
Scenario selection 314 
We selected global emissions scenarios from the IPCC-AR5 database (hosted at the International 315 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis and available at: tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/AR5DB/) and ref. 26 316 
that feature negative GHG emissions by the end of the century and a chance equal to or higher 317 
than 66% to limit global warming to 2°C over the entire 21st century, or equal to or higher than 318 
50% to return to 1.5°C in 2100 compared to pre-industrial levels.  319 
IPCCAR5 scenarios 320 
The temperature likelihood response to 523 of these 846 Kyoto-GHG scenarios from the IPCC-321 
AR5 database was projected using the simple carbon cycle and climate model MAGICC630,31, 322 
under a probabilistic set-up32 (data visualization available at: https://www.pik-potsdam.de/paris-323 
reality-check/ar5-scenario-explorer/). First, we selected from the database 155 scenarios that 324 
have net negative emissions in 2100. Of these 155 scenarios, a sub-selection was made of the 40 325 
scenarios with a likely (≥66%) chance to stay below 2°C throughout the 21st century. Of these 40 326 
scenarios, 2 had a more likely than not (>50%) chance to result in a warming below 1.5°C in 327 
2100. The number of scenarios matching each or a combination of these three criteria – negative 328 
emissions in 2100, 2°C (≥66% over 2010-2100) and 1.5°C (>50% in 2100) – are shown in 329 
Supplementary Table 1 (Supplementary Information). All the selected scenarios that have a more 330 
likely than not chance of warming being below 1.5°C in 2100, also have a likely chance to 331 
remain below 2°C over the 2010-2100 period. Only 2 of the 5 scenarios that have a more likely 332 
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than not chance to be below 1.5°C in 2100 also have negative emissions in 2100. The model and 333 
study names of these scenarios are shown in Supplementary Table 2 (Supplementary 334 
Information).  335 
The ‘2°C-2030peak’ scenarios have higher emissions levels than the ‘2°C-pre2020peak’ but still 336 
have a likely chance to limit warming to 2°C and do not result in higher maximal temperature 337 
over the century. However, these ‘2°C-2030peak’ scenarios are from the MERGE-ETL_2011 338 
model (Supplementary Information) that uses exogenous sulfate forcing33 and feature higher SO2 339 
– an aerosol with a cooling effect – concentrations than other IPCC-AR5 Working Group 3 340 
scenarios34. These aerosol emissions are outside the ranges consistent with the underlying CO2 341 
path35. Moreover, the ‘2°C-2030peak’ scenarios do not peak as soon as possible, as defined in 342 
Article 2 of the Paris Agreement.  343 
Additional 1.5°C scenarios 344 
To this selection of 40 IPCC-AR5 scenarios, we added the 37 scenarios from ref. 26 that have a 345 
more likely than not (>50%) chance to have warming below 1.5°C in 2100. All of these 346 
scenarios have negative emissions in 2100. These 37 scenarios are from the MESSAGE or 347 
REMIND modelling frameworks and the scenario names and descriptions are available in Table 348 
4 of the supplementary information of ref. 26. 349 
The average of all selected 1.5°C scenarios that peak between 2010 and 2020 is 32.6 GtCO2eq in 350 
2030. The UNEP gap report36 identified a 39 GtCO2eq goal for 2030, which corresponds to the 351 
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median of the 1.5°C scenarios (from the same source as our study) with emissions peaking in 352 
2020 only.   353 
(I)NDC scenario 354 
In addition to the selected emissions scenarios, we construct a global emissions scenario that is in 355 
line with current aggregated (I)NDC targets. Between 2010 and 2030, this global ‘2°C-356 
statedINDC’ scenario follows the global emissions from the “(I)NDC factsheets”3 (for ‘high-357 
ambition’ or ‘low-ambition’ assessments, and the average of both), that include emissions 358 
projections of all countries, national Land-Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF), and 359 
international shipping and aviation (‘bunker emissions’) emissions until 2030. Beyond 2030, the 360 
global ‘2°C-statedINDC’ emissions are a 20-year linear interpolation to reach the level of the 361 
average of the global ‘2°C-2030peak’ scenarios (including LULUCF emissions). Beyond 2050, 362 
the global ‘2°C-statedINDC’ scenarios follows the averaged of global ‘2°C-2030peak’ scenarios. 363 
The ‘2°C-statedINDC’ scenario is expected to have a likely chance of limiting global warming to 364 
2°C – with the same limitations regarding SO2 concentrations as the ‘2°C-2030peak’ scenarios. 365 
Indeed, the ‘2°C-statedINDC’ scenario (whether it follows the INDC’s ‘high-ambition’, ‘low-366 
ambition’ assessments, or the average of both) has lower emissions than the average of ‘2°C-367 
2030peak’ scenarios until 2050, and is equal to the average of ‘2°C-2030peak’ scenarios beyond 368 
2050 (see Fig 1). 369 
 370 
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Scenario preparation 371 
We used the Potsdam Real-time Integrated Model for the probabilistic Assessment of emission 372 
Paths (PRIMAP)17 to model allocations approaches. This model contains population, GDP, and 373 
GHG emissions historical and projected data from composite sources as detailed in ref. 24. 374 
Kyoto-GHG emissions are aggregated following the ‘SAR-GWP-100’ (Global Warming 375 
Potential for a 100 year time horizon) as reported in the Second Assessment Report of the 376 
IPCC37 and used under the UNFCCC. 377 
All these global scenarios, shown in Fig. 1a, are harmonized to the PRIMAP17 database’s 2010 378 
emissions of 47.7 GtCO2eq (including LULUCF, and international shipping and aviation 379 
emissions). To do so, emissions are multiplied by a vector that is an interpolation between the 380 
2010 PRIMAP emissions levels divided by the respective 2010 scenarios values, and 1 in 381 
204024,37. 382 
In this study, we allocate emissions of ‘bunker-free’ scenarios that are in line with the global 383 
scenarios selected and constructed as described above, and that exclude LULUCF emissions as 384 
follows. Emissions of the LULUCF sector are not considered by all parties as part of the 385 
emissions scope to be negotiated. Moreover, no universal accounting method of positive or 386 
negative LULUCF emissions is currently in place. Therefore, we exclude LULUCF emissions 387 
from the global scenarios before allocating their emissions across countries. 388 
For the IPCC-AR5 scenarios, we excluded the corresponding LULUCF emissions. For the 37 389 
1.5°C scenarios of ref. 26, where no specific LULUCF emissions were available, we excluded 390 
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the CO2 emissions that do not come from fossil fuels combustion. We then subtracted from these 391 
IPCC-AR5 and ref. 26 scenarios international shipping and aviation emissions from the 392 
QUANTIFY project38 coherent with the IPCC-SRESB1 scenario that limits global warming to 393 
1.8°C compared to the 1980-1999 average24,39. Shipping emissions are 3.9 times higher in 2100 394 
compared to 2010 levels, and aviation emissions double over that same period, but peak in 2062. 395 
While the mitigation targets agreed in Article 4 apply to all GHG, the Paris Agreement contains 396 
no specific reference to bunker emissions. The lack of current policies does not leave ground to 397 
project strong mitigation scenarios40,41. Lower emissions from this sector would reduce the 398 
mitigation burden on all countries. 399 
We also constructed a version of the ‘2°C-statedINDC’ without bunker and LULUCF emissions 400 
following the methodology employed to construct the ‘2°C-statedINDC’ scenario that includes 401 
bunker and LULUCF emissions. This bunker-free ‘2°C-statedINDC’ emissions scenario is the 402 
sum of all national emissions from ref. 3 over the 2010-2030 period. Beyond 2030, the bunker-403 
free ‘2°C-statedINDC’ emissions follow a 20-year linear interpolation to reach the level of the 404 
2050 average of the bunker-free ‘2°C-2030peak’ scenarios (excluding bunker and LULUCF 405 
emissions). Beyond 2050, the bunker-free ‘2°C-statedINDC’ scenario follows the average of the 406 
bunker-free ‘2°C-2030peak’ scenarios. The bunker-free ‘2°C-statedINDC’ scenario is allocated 407 
across countries using our allocation framework from 2030 onwards, when countries have the 408 
emission level of their (I)NDC target4. The ‘2°C-fairINDC’ global scenario is equal to the ‘2°C-409 
statedINDC’ scenario, both with and without LULUCF and bunker emissions. At the national 410 
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level, the emissions allocation of the ‘2°C-fairINDC’ scenario begins in 2010 and therefore 411 
differs from the national emissions of the ‘2°C-statedINDC’ scenario. 412 
All these bunker-free scenarios are harmonized to the PRIMAP17 database’s 2010 emissions of 413 
42.5 GtCO2eq (excluding LULUCF, international shipping and aviation emissions). To do so, 414 
national emissions are multiplied by a vector that is an interpolation between the 2010 PRIMAP 415 
national emissions levels divided by the respective 2010 bunker-free scenarios values, and 1 in 416 
204024,37. These bunker-free scenarios, excluding LULUCF and international shipping and 417 
aviation emissions are shown in Supplementary Figure 1 (Supplementary Information). 418 
The allocation of the scenarios’ bunker-free emissions follows the methodology and the 419 
parameterization described in the supplementary information of ref. 24. The only exception is the 420 
‘2°C-statedINDC’ case whose allocation starts in 2030, starting at estimated national (I)NDC 421 
levels. All other cases have emissions allocations starting in 2010 at national historical levels17. 422 
The GDR allocation approach requires business-as-usual emissions projections. We use RCP8.5, 423 
downscaled using the SSP2 scenario (https://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/SspDb/) from the Shared 424 
Socioeconomic Pathways framework42,43. More details are available in ref. 24. The business-as-425 
usual emissions projections used in the ‘2°C-statedINDC’ beyond 2030 national (I)NDC levels 426 
case follow the growth rates of RCP8.5 over the 2030-2100 period. 427 
The modelling and the parameterization of the equity approaches follow those of a previous 428 
study24. Notably, a 30-year linear transition period is implemented between national 2010 429 
emissions and the allocations under the CAP and EPC approaches. Therefore, in 2030 this 430 
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transition period still slightly favours countries with allocations lower than their 2010 levels – 431 
usually developed countries, and slightly disfavours countries with allocations higher than their 432 
2010 levels. Historical emissions are accounted since 1990 under the GDR and CPC approaches. 433 
The CPC approach applies a 1.5% annual discount rate to emissions before 2010 and achieves 434 
equal cumulative per capita emissions in 2100. The GDR approach allocates emissions 435 
reduction, compared to business-as-usual scenarios, to country’s citizens earning over $7500 (in 436 
purchase power parity) annually.   437 
The distribution of regional mitigation action as represented in least-cost mitigation pathways is 438 
not necessarily equitable. Our results show how pathways that achieve the global Paris 439 
Agreement mitigation goals at lowest cost can be aligned with equity principles at the national 440 
scale. 441 
The (I)NDC assessment used in this study is an average of the ‘high-ambition’ and ‘low-442 
ambition’ cases from ref. 3, except in Fig. 3 that uses ‘high-ambition’ (I)NDC assessment. The 443 
‘high-ambition’ assessment uses conditional (I)NDCs when available as well as the most 444 
ambitious end of the uncertainty associated with the (I)NDC assessment (based on GDP, 445 
population, energy demand projections). The ‘low-ambition’ assessment reflects the lower 446 
ambitions end of the uncertainty associated with the assessment of unconditional (I)NDCs. The 447 
assessments used in this study2,3 used in this study are based on original (I)NDCs, before their 448 
conversion to NDCs. 449 
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Countries with missing data 450 
Deriving the CAP and GDR allocations requires national projections of GDP. The PRIMAP 451 
database does not contain such projections for all countries due to a lack of available data. 452 
Countries with some missing data (‘missing countries’ whose ISO-Alpha 3 country codes are: 453 
'AFG', 'AGO', 'ALB', 'AND', 'ARE', 'ATG', 'COK', 'DMA', 'FSM', 'GRD', 'KIR', 'KNA', 'LIE', 454 
'MCO', 'MHL', 'MMR', 'MNE', 'NIU', 'NRU', 'PLW', 'PRK', 'QAT', 'SMR', 'SSD', 'SYC', 'TUV', 455 
'ZWE') are mostly developing countries whose emissions allocation could represent a significant 456 
fraction of global 2030 emissions, under the CAP allocation in particular given their low GDP 457 
per capita (https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/01/weodata/download.aspx). We 458 
excluded the countries with missing data from the allocations and the remaining countries share 459 
the global ‘bunker-free’ scenarios’ emissions. Figure 3 displays the aggregated conditional 460 
(I)NDCs excluding these ‘missing countries’. As a consequence, the mitigation gaps between the 461 
aggregated (I)NDCs and the aggregated average allocations are affected by the exclusion of 462 
countries’ 2030 (I)NDC emissions (and is greater or smaller depending on how the sum of 463 
average allocations of these countries would compare to the sum of their conditional (I)NDCs). 464 
The gap between that sum of all countries’ conditional (I)NDCs – 49.8 GtCO2eq including the 465 
‘missing countries’ (51.4 GtCO2eq with bunker emissions), excluding LULUCF emissions – and 466 
the sum of available average allocations – 40.1 GtCO2eq – would be 9.6 GtCO2eq instead of 8.8 467 
GtCO2eq. As a reminder, the gap between the ‘major economies’ (G8 plus China) aggregated 468 
conditional (I)NDCs and their aggregated allocation is of 9.6 GtCO2eq. The conclusions of 469 
Figure 3 are still valid in this configuration. Note that the aggregate level of all ‘high-ambition’ 470 
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(I)NDCs including LULUCF emissions (including the ‘missing countries’) is 49.4 GtCO2eq, and 471 
47.8 GtCO2eq excluding bunker emissions.  472 
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